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RECENT CASE
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-SEX DISCRIMINATION
IN SENTENCING CRIMINAL OFFENDERS IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL-After
conviction on various gambling charges, defendant females in
the six consolidated cases were all sentenced to indeterminate
terms in the New Jersey Correctional Institution for Women. In
New Jersey, male offenders convicted of the same crime receive
a minimum-maximum term in the State Prison, and the sentencing
judge has the discretion to fix the maximum limit of confinement
within prescribed parameters.1 When the defendant is a female,
the judge is required to sentence her to an indeterminate term
of up to five years in the Correctional Institution for Women,
and the judge has no discretion to lower the maximum period
of confinement.2 The actual term of incarceration served by the
female offender is entirely dependent upon the institution's board
of managers,3 while male offenders may earn earlier release
through statutory "good-time" provisions4  or by application to
the State Parole Board.5 No such release program is available
for female prisoners. On appeal the New Jersey Supreme Court
held that disparate sentencing based upon sex classifications violates
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment to the
U.S. Constitution. Where the fundamental right of liberty is re-
strained, in conjunction with a classification system based upon
sex,6 a state statute is unconstitutional unless a compelling state
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A: 164-17 (1971) provides that:
All sentences to the New Jersey State Prison shall be for a maximum and mini-
mum term. . . . The maximum term shall not be in excess of the maximum
term prescribed by law for the offense for which the offender was convicted.
The minimum term shall not be less than 1 year.
2. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-155 (Supp. 1973) states:
The several courts in sentencing to the Correctional Institution for Women shall
not fix or limit the duration of the sentence, except as otherwise provided for
herein, but the time which the prisoner shall serve in the reformatory or on
parole shall not exceed five years....
3. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4-155 (Supp. 1973) declares that: "[t~he term may be terminated
by the board of managers in accordance with its rules and regulations."
4. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-92, -141 (1971).
5. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 30:4-123.1, -123.10, -123.12 (1971).
6. A similar disparity exists in North Dakota, although it involves a "males-only" re-
quirement for commitment to the state farm, a minimum-security correctional institution
for misdemeanants, pursuant to N.D. CENT. CoD § 12-51-01 (1960). Prisoners serving a
custodial sentence at the state farm are deemed to have committed a misdemeanor offense,
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interest is shown. The state's claim that females were better sub-
jects for rehabilitation, although a longer confinement might be
necessary for that purpose, was insufficient to justify the infringe-
ment upon liberty. State v. Chambers, 63 N.J. 287, 307 A.2d 78
(1973).
Only a few decisions as late as 1927 even peripherially consider-
ed the question of sex discrimination in sentencing.7 Even those
decisions did not reach the precise issue raised in modem cases,
namely that certain classes of females are receiving potentially
longer custodial sentences than similarly situated male offenders.
In fact, early New Jersey statutes did not differentiate between
males and females in sentencing, because the only state institution
for confinement was the State Prison. However, as interest in
prison reform began to grow, women were singled out by the
legislature for special treatment. By 1910 a Reformatory for Women
was established, and the indeterminate sentencing scheme initi-
ated.8 The commitment to "reform" was still riding high in 1946
when the Maine Supreme Court upheld an unequal sentencing stat-
ute. Citing a perceived legislative need for freedom to experiment
within the broad area of prison reform," the court validated a
statute which provided that women could be incarcerated for po-
tentially longer periods of time than men for similar offenses. 10
In testing the constitutionality of a challenged statute, the ju-
diciary has traditionally deferred to the legislative branch of govern-
ment, upholding such action whenever a rational basis for the
contested classification could be advanced." But where a "funda-
mental" right has been infringd upon, or where classifications are
based upon "suspect" criteria, a stricter test is applied. That stan-
dard is the compelling state interest test. 12 This stricter standard
even though a felony sentence was possible under state law, according to the provisions of
N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-51-07 (1960). No similar institution or sentencing system is provided
for females.
7. State v. Heitman, 105 Kan. 39, 181 P. 630 (1919) ; Platt v. Commonwealth, 256 Mass.
539, 152 N.E. 914 (1926) ; Ex parte Brady, 116 Ohio St. 512, 157 N.E. 69 (1927) ; Ex parte
Fenwick, 110 Ohio St. 350, 144 N.E. 269 (1924), appeal dismissed sub nom. Fenwick v.
Myers, 275 U.S. 485 (1927). In all cases, the potential maximum term was the same for
both sexes, only the indeterminate nature of the sentence for females was questioned, and
upheld.
8. N.J. LAws ch. 72 (1910).
9. Reform of the penal structure in North Dakota was being attempted by the enact-
ment of N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-51-01 (1960), providing for "a correctional Institution for male
violators of the law" (emphasis added), named the state farm. This Institution was pri-
marily for the commitment of first offenders, to insulate them from possible corrupting in-
fluences presented by hardened inmates of the State Prison.
10. Ex parte Gosselin. 141 Me. 412, 44 A.2d 882 (1945), appeal dismissed sub nom.
Gosselin v. Kelley, 328 U.S. 817 (1946).
11. See Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911).
12. Cox, Foreword: Constitutional Adjudication and the Promotion of Human Rights, 80
HaLv. L. REv. 91 (1966). Cox's two elements are:
(1) the relative invidiousness of the particular differentiation, such as between
men of different races, farmer and city-dweller, rich and poor, literate and 11-
literate, or men and women, [and]
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of analysis has been applied where such fundamental rights as
privacy,1  voting,14 interstate travel,15 criminal appeals, e and pro-
creation17 have been interfered with, or where classifications based
upon race,18 alienage,1 9 to some extent wealth, 20 and perhaps sex21
have been established.
The approach used by the New Jersey Supreme Court in the
instant case is not so easily categorized. While stating that "certain
classifications by their very nature are inherently suspect . . . "
the court stopped short of declaring sex a suspect criterion for
legislative classification. Instead, application of the compelling state
interest test seems predicated upon a finding that because the
fundamental right of liberty is impaired, a classification based
upon sex cannot be tolerated. Evidencing what Gerald Gunther
calls "an undercurrent of resistance to the sharp difference between
deferential old and interventionist new equal protection . .
Justice Marshall, dissenting in Dandridge v. Williams,28  has ad-
vanced a similar method of analyzing equal protection challenges.
In deciding whether or not strict scrutiny is to be applied, Marshall
would use a "multifactor, sliding-scale" approach, in effect balanc-
ing the value of the right infringed upon with the discriminatory
characteristics of the classification under challenge. 24  Where the
interrelationship of these two gradients produces results deemed
too restrictive, the strict scrutiny standard would apply. Such a
discriminatory scheme is involved in the instant case, where the
fundamental right of liberty is on one gradient, and the classification
based upon sex on the other.25 Hence, the compelling state interest
(2) the relative Importance of the subject with respect to which equality Is
sought, such as the vote, the defense of a criminal prosecution, or civil litigation.
Id. at 95.
13. Roe v. Wade. 410 U.S. 113 (1972)-
14. Dunn v. Blumsteln, 405 U.S. 330 (1972).
15. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
16. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963).
17. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
18. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) ; Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S.
303 (1879).
19. Takahashl v. Fish Comm'n., 334 U.S. 410' (1948).
20. Harper v. Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
21. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. - (1973).
22. Gunther, In Search of Evolving Doctrine On a Changing Court: A Model for a New
Equal Protection, 86 HAav. L. REv. 1, 17 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Evolving Doctrine].
23. 897 U.S. 471 (1970).
24. See generally Evolving Doctrine, supra note 22 at 17-18.
25. A similar discriminatory classification Is found In the case of State v. Iverson, Crim.
File No. 9138 (Dist. Ct. N.D., March 29, 1973). In that case, two women convicted under
the state's narcotic laws were sentenced to the State Farm, but administrative officials
transported them to a South Dakota facility for confinement, pursuant to contracts en-
tered Into between that state and North Dakota, under legislative authority to so contract.
At a hearing ordered by Judge Ralph Maxwell of the First Judicial District Court In
Fargo, Cass County, North Dakota, the following exchange occurred between Judge Max-
well and Walter Fiedler, Director of Institutions for the State of North Dakota:
THE COURT: As I understand It, Mr. Fledler, the reason then that these de-
fendants were not taken into the State Farm is because they were women?
THE WITNESS: As the warden explained, Your Honor, It Is open barracks,
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test was applied.
In analyzing the question of whether or not a classification
is violative of the equal protection clause, it is also helpful to
examine the benefits which flow from the statute and concurrently
review any burdens which may fall upon the selected class. 26 Look-
ing at the statutory scheme utilized in New Jersey for determining
sentences of convicted offenders, it appears that the burden of
confinement falls more heavily upon the class of female offenders.
Since there is no countervailing benefit asserted by the state, the
classification must fall.2 7  Furthermore, because certain benefits
relating to early release and review of sentences are available
only to males, and no similar process is applicable to female
inmates, the statute also fails to insure equal treatment in com-
pleting the sentence. 2  Such disparity of treatment cannot survive
strict scrutiny, and the sentencing scheme, as applied to females,
is unconstitutional. 29
there is no place to keep them except among the male Inmates.
THE COURT: Well, the reason they weren't taken there is because they were
women, Is that correct?
THE WITNESS: Yes. We have no facilities for women, and the Legislature pro-
vided us funds to contract out of state.
THE COURT: Apparently then If I were to order them today again into your
custody or into the custody of the warden, they would again be transported to
Yankton [South Dakota] for confinement, Is that correct?
THE WITNESS: I would consult with the Attorney General and abide by his
decision.
THE COURT: What is your position, Mr. Fiedler?
THE WITNESS: I certainly feel they would be much better off at Yankton than
they would be at the State Farm.
THE COURT: Then you would take the position that-
THE WITNESS: I think I would transfer them again.00*
THE COURT: But if I committed two men, you would have accepted them at
the State Farm?
THE WITNESS: Yes. We have facilities for men there.
26. See Rosenblum v. Griffin, 89 N.H. 314, 197 A. 701 (1938).
27. But see Wark v. State, 266 A.2d 62 (Me. 1970) (Behavioral differences justify po-
tentially longer sentences for males convicted of escape than that Imposed upon female
escapees).
28. In North Dakota. N.D. CENr. CODE § 12-51-07 (Supn. 1978) provides that a felony con-
viction will be treated as a misdemeanor once the offender has been committed to the
State Farm. No such special institution is available for the benefit of a female defendant.
The only possibility for such a reduction in degree of the offense is N.D. CxNT. CoD 12-01-07(1960), which declares that sentences to county jails, for both males and females, will be
thereafter treated as misdemeanors. However, county Jail incarceration is deemed by many an
unacceptable alternative to the rehabilitative programming that a minimum-security cor-
rectional institution can provide.
29. In State v. Iverson, Crim. File No. 9138 (DIst. Ct. N.D., March 29, 1973). Judge
Maxwell concluded that:
Because they were women, they were not housed in the Institution to which they
were committed as they would have been If they had been men. Instead under
the undisputed testimony, they were manacled together and hauled to a distant
place where again, according to undisputed testimony, they were to live with
felony convicts and to sup with lunatics. The detriment Incident to being sent to
and held in a place remote from North Dakota courts, from their lawyers, their
families and friends is obvious, and these have been alluded to in previous ses-
sions in these cases. These added pains and penalties were to be theirs because,
and only because they are female rather than male persons (emphasis added).
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Chambers presents the modern view in two respects. First,
by implication the court applies a more realistic method of testing
the constitutionality of statutes challenged on equal protection
grounds. That method is the sliding-scale approach, analyzing the
interaction between the legislative classification and the right in-
volved. This approach allows a pragmatic look at factors clearly
interrelated when considering equal protection questions, rather
than demanding that a ruling be based upon a finding of either
a suspect classification or upon the infringement of a fundamental
right. Second, the court implicitly strikes down any statutory scheme
that would subject females to more restrictive custodial sentences
than males in similar circumstances. Although females as a class
may be more receptive to proffered rehabilitation programs, that
alone is not sufficient to justify lorger periods of incarceration.
Furthermore, no additional rehabilitative purpose has been advanc-
ed to justify this, or any other, sexually-based discriminatory sen-
tencing scheme.
The type of sentencing disparity presented in the instant case
is not the only one that confronts the courts today. In North Dakota,
males eligible for sentencing under a special statute have the degree
of their offense reduced from a felony to a misdemeanor upon
commitment to the state farm 0 Some states contract s' with
neighboring jurisdictions for the care and custody of female con-
victs, but men are confined solely within the sentencing state itself.
There is little likelihood that these "males-only" benefits can be
sustained as fulfilling a compelling state interest. Therefore, they
appear vulnerable to an equal protection challenge . 2
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It is discrimination both arbitrary and invidious, and in my opinion plainly
prohibited by the spirit and letter of the Fourteenth Amendment and the statutes
passed in implementation of that amendment.***
So far my efforts to assure the defendants equal treatment have been
stymied by the action of administration officials. These officials in their testi-
mony in court today have not evinced a great concern about the constitutional
aspects of the case. . . . To them it appears that the costs involved and the in-
conveniences involved are of greater concern than the Constitution.
30. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-51-07 (Supp. 1973) ; N.D. CENT. CODE § 12-01-07 (1960).
31. N.D. CENT. CODE § 54-21-25 (Supp. 1973).
32. The issue became moot in the Iverson case when the judge, perhaps bowing to the
state's practicality argument, resentenced the two female defendants to terms in the Cass
County jail. In doing so, however, Judge Maxwell did make it clear that only the absence
of clear authority deterred him from again imposing a state farm sentence on the women.
Only an action to which the administrative officials themselves were parties would have
conferred such authority upon Judge Maxwell. He considered that placing such a burden
upon the defendants and their attorneys would be unfair, as they would then be "pitted
alone against all the resources of the state. The question is: How else can the issue
be effectively raised?

